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LEGAL PERSPECTIVES
IDENTITY POLITICS AND THE SECOND
AMENDMENT
Michael C. Dorf*
I. SOME REALISM ABOUT GUN RIGHTS AND OTHER
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Two questions dominate judicial and academic consideration of the
degree, if any, to which the Second Amendment should be construed
to limit government efforts to restrict private ownership and
possession of firearms. First, what was the original understanding of
those who framed and ratified the Amendment? And second, how, if
at all, do changed circumstances since 1791 bear on the application of
the original understanding to contemporary circumstances?
The answers to these two questions are obviously relevant to any
inquiry into the proper construction of the right to keep and bear
arms. After all, even judges and constitutional scholars who do not
subscribe to originalism as an overarching interpretive philosophy
acknowledge that the original understanding appropriately plays an
important role in discerning contemporary meaning.1 And conversely,
even self-described originalists acknowledge that application of the
original meaning across a span of centuries requires some effort at
"translating" the old text to make it fit the new circumstances.2 So
judges and scholars are not wrong to ask whether the reference in the
* Michael I. Sovern Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. I
gratefully acknowledge very helpful comments and suggestions from Sherry Colb,
Saul Cornell, Robert Cottrol, and Neysun Mahboubi, as well as terrific research
assistance from Candice Aloisi and Akiva Goldfarb.
1. For discussion of how and why non-originalists (such as the author) consider
original understanding relevant to constitutional interpretation, see Michael C. Dorf,
Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original
Meaning, 85 Geo. L.J. 1765 (1997).
2. Lawrence Lessig, whom I would describe as a weak originalist (in matters of
constitutional interpretation), has developed an account of fidelity across time as
translation. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1165 (1993).
But even strong-form originalists endorse the concept. See Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d
970, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) ("[I]t is the task of the judge in this
generation to discern how the framers' values, defined in the context of the world
they knew, apply to the world we know.").
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Amendment's introductory language to a "well regulated Militia"3
originally referred to the whole people or a smaller group, whether
that language was understood as limiting the operative clause's
protection of a "right... to keep and bear Arms,"4 and whether that
right, assuming it did protect private weapons ownership and
possession, was subject to extensive government regulation. Nor are
they wrong to ponder what happens to a right designed to ensure
independent militias (if that is what the Amendment was designed to
secure), when state-organized militias have been absorbed into a
system of national military service, when modern police forces have
replaced militias as the principal source of protection (other than self-
help) against private violence, and when firearms have become more
lethal than they were in the eighteenth century.
But if these questions about original meaning and subsequent
evolution preoccupy scholars, so far as the prospects for legal change
through the judiciary are concerned, they are, I shall argue here,
largely epiphenomenal. Although courts may speak the language of
original understanding and subsequent translation when justifying
their decisions, the driving force of doctrinal change is rarely the
discovery of some previously unknown scrap of paper from Madison's
notes or a state ratifying convention.' Nor do courts simply decide in
response to a lawyer's argument that some changed circumstance
demands a changed understanding of the Constitution's original
meaning. Courts adjust doctrine largely in response to social and
political movements.
3. U.S. Const. amend. II.
4. Id.
5. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72-73 (1938), is an ostensible
example of a major shift in Supreme Court doctrine that was driven by a new
discovery regarding (statutory) original understanding. There, Justice Brandeis
justified his conclusion that the prior interpretation of the founding era Rules of
Decision Act was incorrect by the discovery of an earlier draft of the legislation:
[I]t was the more recent research of a competent scholar, who examined the
original document, which established that the construction given to it by the
Court was erroneous; and that the purpose of the section was merely to
make certain that, in all matters except those in which some federal law is
controlling, the federal courts exercising jurisdiction in diversity of
citizenship cases would apply as their rules of decision the law of the State,
unwritten as well as written.
Id. at 72-73 (citing Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary
Act of 1789, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 49, 51-52, 81-88, 108 (1923)). The argument is
implausible on its face. Where the enacted language made "the laws of the several
States" rules of decision in federal court cases, the earlier draft referred to "the
Statute law of the several States in force for the time being and their unwritten or
common law now in use." Warren, supra, at 51, 86. Warren and Brandeis treated the
final language as a shorthand for the earlier draft, but it as easily could have reflected
a Congressional decision to narrow the scope of the Act. In any event, and more
importantly, the Erie decision was primarily a response to social, political, and legal
trends in the first third of the twentieth century. See Edward Purcell, Brandeis and the
Progressive Constitution (2000).
[Vol. 73
IDENTITY POLITICS
That claim obviously sounds in legal realism, but I do not mean to
say that legal reasoning is only so much window dressing for political
judgments. Legal reasoning makes a difference: Once an issue
becomes the legitimate subject of legal contestation before a court,
judges acting in good faith will try to sort good legal arguments from
bad and to see where the weight of the best arguments leads; and as
Benjamin Cardozo long ago observed, legal principles have a life of
their own within the courts.6 But before any of that can occur, an
issue must become the legitimate subject of legal contestation. How
does that happen?
Social movements change attitudes that previously made some set
of arguments seem, in Jack Balkin's phrase, "off the wall."7 To give a
current example, the analogy between anti-miscegenation laws and
laws barring same-sex marriage would have seemed ridiculous in 1967,
when the Supreme Court decided Loving v. Virginia.' Today,
arguments that such prohibitions deny gays and lesbians the equal
protection of the laws are a staple of the academic literature and have
found a receptive audience among at least some judges. The
difference between 1967 and 2004 is not the discovery of a previously
unknown letter revealing that John Bingham and Jacob Howard were
lovers or that lawyers and judges are smarter now and thus better able
to understand the implications of Loving. The main difference is that
social and political movements for equality for gays, lesbians,
bisexuals, and transgendered persons have changed attitudes among a
critical mass of the public. Whether they have changed attitudes
sufficiently to secure durable legal protection remains to be seen, but
that is not my concern here.
Elsewhere I have explained how social movements prepare the
ground for doctrinal change.' Here I want to make a related but
distinct claim: Successful arguments for doctrinal change typically
link the relevant social and political movement with the doctrine that
activists seek to change. For example, champions of the rights of
African Americans argued in the 1950s and 1960s that Jim Crow was a
system of institutionalized white supremacy, and the Supreme Court
invalidated Jim Crow in just those terms. Likewise, feminists in the
1960s and 1970s argued that patriarchy's notion of separate spheres
subordinated women and, again, the Court responded in the same
terms.1" And today's movement to change the legal status of
discrimination based on sexual orientation insists on (state and
6. See Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 51 (1921).
7. J.M. Balkin, Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, 65
Fordham L. Rev. 1703, 1733 (1997).
8. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
9. Michael C. Dorf, The Paths to Legal Equality, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 791, 805-06
(2002).
10. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
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federal) constitutional rights to sexual autonomy and equality that
closely track social and political developments.
The movement for gun rights is different. There is a substantial
mismatch between, on the one hand, the constitutional arguments for
an individual right to own and possess firearms and, on the other
hand, the identity politics movement that underwrites those
arguments. The constitutional argument sounds largely in history: It
claims a private right to firearms based on the original understanding
of the Second Amendment (or in a variant, the Fourteenth
Amendment); and to the extent that supporters of a private right to
firearms make frankly normative arguments, they invoke the image of
the law-abiding citizen defending herself or himself against an attack
that the organized police are unable to prevent or stop.]' Yet the
people who care most about an individual right to firearms ownership
and possession are neither minutemen nor, for the most part, the law-
abiding inner-city residents most likely to be victimized by crime. The
former have vanished, and the latter tend to support gun control.12
The people who want an individual right to own and possess
firearms are disproportionately white, male, and rural.13 To put the
point crudely, they tend to be the "bubba vote," "Nascar dads," or, in
Howard Dean's memorably unfortunate phrase, "guys with
Confederate flags in their pickup trucks."14 These "angry white men"
may well comprise a powerful identity politics movement -one that is,
very broadly speaking, anti-abortion, anti-affirmative action, anti-gay
marriage, anti-tax, and pro-gun'l-but, at least with respect to the gun
11. Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 413, 455
(1999) (noting a "positive correlation between opposition to gun control and distrust
of the police") (citing Kenneth Adams, Guns and Gun Control, in Americans View
Crime and Justice: A National Public Opinion Survey 109, 122-24 (Timothy J.
Flanagan & Dennis R. Longmire eds., 1996)).
12. See id. at 453, 458.
13. See Dan M. Kahan, The Gun Control Debate, 60 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 3, 4
(2003) (citing Tom W. Smith, 1999 National Gun Policy Survey of the National
Opinion Research Center: Research Findings 19-24 (2000), available at
www.norc.uchicago.edu/online/gunrpt.pdf; and Gary Kleck, Crime, Culture Conflict
and the Sources of Support for Gun Control, 39 Am. Behav. Sci. 387, 390, 398 (1996)).
14. Thomas Beaumont, Kerry Criticizes Dean's Gun Views, Des Moines Reg.,
Nov. 1, 2003, at 1B (quoting a telephone interview with Howard Dean).
15. Kahan, supra note 11, at 461 (describing the political tactic of gun control
opponents in the House of Representatives as "linking gun control to abortion,
promiscuity, irreligiousity, and myriad other practices and policies perceived to be
threatening to their constituents' cultural identities"); see also Representative J.C.
Watts, A Call to Arms: Renewing America, Keynote Address at the NRA Annual
Convention in Charlotte, North Carolina (May 20, 2000) (arguing that gun violence in
schools is a result of "easy divorce," the lack of a "male influence" in families,
"extremely liberal abortion laws," "well-intentioned but harmful public welfare
policies," a lack of "real pro-family tax relief," and "a society which undermines
parental authority, which marginalizes religion, and which steeps its children in a
violent and sexually obsessed popular culture"), available at
http://www.nraila.org/News/Read/Speeches.aspx?ID=1 1.
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question, they have not, thus far, been able to translate their grievance
into the language of judicially enforceable constitutional rights.
This Article compares and contrasts the law and politics of the gun
rights movement with the law and politics of movements that have
secured constitutional change through, or at least abetted by, the
courts. Part II describes the general pattern by which the Supreme
Court has recognized previously unrecognized constitutional rights
over roughly the last half century, with special reference to claims by
African Americans, women, and sexual minorities. Both with respect
to equality claims as such and claims for the freedom to engage in
some particular form of conduct, the Court has tended to look
favorably on rights claims when those claims have been tied to a social
movement to end some form of oppression of an identity group. I do
not argue that such a link to an identity politics movement is strictly
speaking either necessary or sufficient to securing judicial recognition
of the claimed rights, but I do provide evidence that it is a substantial
aid.
Part III asks how the movement for gun rights compares with the
successful rights movements described in Part II. Although I identify
some important similarities, on balance I find that the differences are
more substantial.
Accordingly, my almost entirely descriptive and predictive (rather
than normative) analysis concludes as follows: Whatever the merits of
the arguments for the view that the Second Amendment prohibits
most or many forms of regulation of private ownership and possession
of firearms, conditions are not ripe for the Supreme Court to accept
those arguments. That could change of course. For example, new
conservative Justices selected for their anti-abortion views or their
general jurisprudential approach might turn out to take an expansive
view of the Second Amendment. But apart from such fortuitous
change through the appointments process, the Court will not likely
accept the individual right view until its proponents find a way to link
it successfully with an identity politics movement that generates
greater sympathy for itself among the general population and,
especially, legal elites.
II. How SUCCESSFUL RIGHTS MOVEMENTS ENGAGE IDENTITY
POLITICS
Legal rights in the American tradition tend to take the form of
universal protection for individuals regardless of their circumstances.
The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses apply to every "person."16 The constitutional proscriptions on
discrimination with respect to voting identify particular prohibited
16. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
2004]
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classifications-"race," "sex," and "age"" 7-rather than identifying
protected classes-such as African Americans, women, and young
adults. Likewise, the foundational anti-discrimination statute, the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, states universal symmetrical principles.18
The First Amendment protects expression by criminals and
corporations no less than politicians because, in the Court's view, the
identity of the speaker is largely irrelevant to whether the "freedom of
speech" is being infringed. 9  To be sure, where Congress has
unequivocally stated that a legal right belongs to a discrete class of
persons-such as those with disabilities-the Court has accepted that
limitation.E0 But where claimants have asked the Court for protection
17. U.S. Const. amend. XV, § 1 (race); U.S. Const. amend. XIX, § 1 (sex); U.S.
Const. amend. XXVI, § 1 (age).
18. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2000) ("All persons shall be
entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in
this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color,
religion, or national origin.").
19. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105
(1991) (criminal); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 & n.13
(1978) (corporation). But cf. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 124 S. Ct. 619, 725-
26 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The last proposition that might explain at least some of today's casual
abridgment of free-speech rights is this: that the particular form of
association known as a corporation does not enjoy full First Amendment
protection. Of course the text of the First Amendment does not limit its
application in this fashion ... [n]or is there any basis in reason why First
Amendment rights should not attach to corporate associations-and we
have said so.
Id. (citing Belotti, 435 U.S. at 765).
20. The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") does not provide all persons
with protection against discrimination against them on the basis of whether or not
they have a disability. Rather, it only provides legal protection to persons with
disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12102(2) (2000). The Supreme Court has
enforced that vision strictly by limiting the number of persons who may qualify for
protection under the ADA. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483-87
(1999) (rejecting the claim that persons with correctable conditions should be
considered disabled under the ADA because, among other things, such a reading of
the statute would grant protection to a much larger class of persons than Congress
stated it wished to protect). In cases involving statutes other than the ADA, the
Court has, with one exception, clearly held that general anti-discrimination laws
protect all persons, even if the protection may take somewhat different forms where
programs of affirmative action are challenged. See, e.g., United Steel Workers v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979) (holding that an affirmative action plan, collectively
bargained for by an employer and a union, did not constitute race discrimination in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280-81 n.8 (1976) (holding, in a case not involving
affirmative action, that Title VII protects whites as well as blacks from certain forms
of racial discrimination). The one exception concerns the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA"). In General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, 124
S. Ct. 1236 (2004), the Court held that the ADEA's prohibition on discrimination
based on "age" only prohibits discrimination on the basis of old age. It is not obvious
that this is a correct reading of the statute. See id. at 1250 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(accusing the majority of substituting Congress's main purpose for the text's
IDENTITY POLITICS
for rights particular to them as members of a group, they have not
fared well, even when, as in the case of the First Amendment's Free
Exercise Clause,2' the relevant legal text could readily be construed to
grant such particular protection.22
Accordingly, it may be tempting to think that American legal
rights-and especially American constitutional rights-simply
respond to individual claims. But while this characterization may be
broadly accurate with respect to operative doctrine,23 it does not fairly
describe the process by which courts come to recognize that some
general constitutional text encompasses universal protection against
some form of discrimination or for some class of activity. That
process typically responds to a social movement to end what is
claimed to be the oppression of some discrete social group.
The phenomenon is easy to discern with respect to race.
Undoubtedly having African Americans in mind, Chief Justice Stone
famously observed in his footnote in United States v. Carolene
Products that the presumption of constitutionality that ordinarily
attaches to legislation has less scope where, inter alia, legal disabilities
are placed upon "discrete and insular minorities."24  Much ink has
been spilled on the question of what criteria ought to be used to
identify groups in need of protection-whether, for example, political
powerlessness, a history of oppression, and the immutability of some
important characteristic are as salient as, or more salient than,
discreteness and insularity.25 Perhaps even more ink has been spilled
on the question of whether the Supreme Court is right to read the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection as attaching to all
individuals rather than to members of particular groups, as containing
an anti-discrimination principle rather than what has sometimes been
called an anti-subordination principle.26 Here I will put aside these
language). But whether rightly or wrongly, General Dynamics reads the ADEA as
out of step with the main body of federal anti-discrimination law.
21. U.S. Const. amend. I.
22. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
23. There is an important exception to this broad description, however. Although
the Court's precedents nominally require "symmetry" in the treatment of equal
protection claims advanced by racial minorities and non-minorities, see Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226-27 (1995), in practice the Court arguably
applies different standards. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 394 (2003)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (discussing the majority's supposed "abandonment of strict
scrutiny").
24. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
25. For two of the most thoughtful discussions of these and related questions, see
Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 713 (1985); and
Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1753 (1996).
26. For the classic statement of the anti-subordination view, see Owen Fiss,
Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 107 (1976). For the
classic reply, see Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination
Principle, 90 Harv. L Rev. 1 (1976). For a recent exchange of views, including my
own tentative defense of the anti-discrimination approach, see Bepress Online,
2004]
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interesting questions to note the obvious: In formulating equal
protection doctrine, the Court began with the claims of oppressed
African Americans and then generalized outward; there was and
continues to be disagreement over how far and in what directions to
generalize, but the phenomenon is clear enough. The expansion of
constitutional doctrine responded to a social and political movement
that aimed (initially) to improve the treatment and conditions of
African Americans.
In the hagiography of Thurgood Marshall and the Warren Court,
courageous lawyers and judges challenged and defeated Jim Crow in
the name of the Constitution. That view, of course, is incomplete. As
Gerald Rosenberg argues in The Hollow Hope,27 Brown v. Board of
Education28 and other Supreme Court desegregation decisions did not
actually bring about much in the way of desegregation. That task was
accomplished-to the extent that it was-largely after Congress
authorized the Justice Department to bring enforcement actions.29
But Rosenberg's own view of courts as largely paper tigers is itself
incomplete, for courts and political actors exist in a dialectical
relationship. Rosenberg attributes what progress we as a society have
made toward racial equality to the civil rights movement of the 1960s,
but he overlooks the extent to which Brown and other decisions
catalyzed that movement by putting the Court's prestige behind it.3"
And just as Brown interacted with a social and political movement, so
it came out of one.
It is by now commonplace that Brown was more a feature of Cold
War ideological struggle than of discerning the Equal Protection
Clause's "true" meaning. Competing with Soviet and Chinese
Communism for hearts and minds in developing countries, the United
States found racial segregation to be an embarrassment.31
That is not to say, of course, that lawyering and judging were
irrelevant. The legal strategy of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund-
using the master's tools to tear down the master's house by first
bringing cases like Sweatt v. Painter3" that nominally operated within
Symposium on Groups and the Equal Protection Clause (August 2002), at
http://www.bepress.com/cgi/query.cgi.
27. Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social
Change? (1991).
28. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
29. For this point and other ones relevant to my argument here, see William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law
in the Twentieth Century, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 2062, 2091 (2002).
30. See, e.g., Neal Devins, Judicial Matters, 80 Cal. L. Rev. 1027, 1042 (1992)
(reviewing Rosenberg, supra note 27) ("Title IV of the 1964 Act, authorizing the
Justice Department to file desegregation lawsuits, seems a direct response to
Brown.").
31. See Mary Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American
Democracy (2000).
32. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
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the Plessy v. Ferguson" regime of "separate but equal"-was indeed
brilliant. But it was only a legal strategy of a multi-pronged attack on
segregation.
More fundamentally for my purposes here-yes, this Article will
double back to the Second Amendment in due course, I promise-the
formal constitutional arguments in Brown, the sorts of things that get
studied in constitutional law courses, such as original understanding
and reasoning by analogy, seemed to have little to do with the
outcome. How else could one explain the fact that half a century
later, we are still puzzling over how the Court might have written a
better opinion?34 Or that the sum of the Court's explanation for why
the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, adopted in 1791 by a
slave-owning republic, barred racially segregated schools, was that any
other result would be "unthinkable."35 My point is not that the Court
was wrong to hold that racial apartheid denies equal protection. My
point is simply that the Court's decision to do so was a response to
social and political forces that shifted racial segregation from the
category of unchallengeable to unsustainable.
The relevance of the original understanding in Brown is instructive.
After the case was first argued, the Court-ordered re-argument
focused on the question of the original understanding of the
Fourteenth Amendment.36  Whether the Court was genuinely
interested in the question in 1953 or whether the question was simply
a stalling tactic in light of internal divisions is not entirely clear. It is
clear, however, that the original understanding was not the basis for
the Court's ruling; it was at best an obstacle to be overcome, which is
exactly how the Court treated it, saying that evidence of the original
understanding was "inconclusive"37 and proceeding directly to
normative arguments. The Court's essential reasoning-that
"separate [is] inherently unequal"38 because apartheid was intended to
and in fact stigmatized African American schoolchildren-was a quite
straightforward translation of the moral argument made in the
political realm.
Other constitutional equality movements over the last half century
have followed the same pattern. Women's quest for equality in the
New World is at least as old as the Republic, but even if we discount
Abigail Adams's plea that John and his co-revolutionaries
33. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
34. See What Brown v. Board of Education Should Have Said (Jack M. Balkin et.
al. eds., 2001).
35. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
36. See Gebhart v. Belton, 345 U.S. 972 (1953) (order restoring the case to the
docket for re-argument).
37. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,489 (1954).
38. Id. at 495.
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"[r]emember the [lladies, ' 39 we do well to recall that the 1848 Seneca
Falls Declaration preceded the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment by two decades and preceded the adoption of the
Nineteenth Amendment by more than seven decades. Why then, was
it not until the early 1970s that the Supreme Court ruled that legal
distinctions drawn on the basis of sex should trigger heightened
judicial scrutiny?4"
The answer, once again, has hardly anything to do with the original
understanding. Far from intending to eliminate most official sex
distinctions, the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause introduced into the Constitution (in the
Fourteenth Amendment's Section 2) a sex line. That provision
penalizes states for disenfranchising their "male inhabitants" aged
twenty-one and over.4 1 Is it likely that the people who saw no
difficulty in thereby (implicitly but clearly) authorizing the
disenfranchisement of women thought that Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment extended equal civil rights to women? "The
paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil[l] the noble and
benign offices of wife and mother," Justice Bradley famously opined
just four years after the Fourteenth Amendment's adoption,42 and his
was hardly a minority view.
Only after a century of political and social struggle was the Supreme
Court prepared to hold, as it finally did in Craig v. Boren, that official
distinctions drawn on the basis of sex trigger heightened judicial
scrutiny.43  The Court's reasoning in Craig and related cases
transparently tracked social and political developments. The Court
decried "archaic and overbroad generalizations" as well as
"increasingly outdated misconceptions concerning the role of females
in the home rather than in the marketplace and world of ideas."'  In
other words, times and attitudes change, and interpretation of the
Constitution changes with them.
The merits of this approach to constitutional interpretation-
sometimes associated by its proponents and critics alike with what has
been called the "living" Constitution 45 -is not my concern here,
39. Letter from Abigail Adams, to John Adams (March 31, 1776), in I Adams
Family Correspondence 370 (L.H. Butterfield et al. eds., 1963).
40. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
41. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 2.
42. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring in the
judgment).
43. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (stating what has come to be known
as the intermediate scrutiny test).
44. Id. at 198-99 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
45. Compare William J. Brennan, Jr., Education and the Bill of Rights, 113 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 219, 224 (1964) ("[Tlhe genius of our Constitution resides not in any static
meaning it may have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in its applicability and
adaptability to current needs and problems."), with William Rehnquist, The Notion of
a Living Constitution, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 693 (1976) (criticizing this approach).
[Vol. 73
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though in the interest of full disclosure, I can explain briefly in a
footnote why, if pressed, I would cast my lot with the proponents. 6
My point is descriptive rather than prescriptive: As a matter of
observed sociological fact, the shift in constitutional doctrine
governing judicial review of official sex discrimination followed shifts
in public attitudes, which the doctrine came to mirror.
The same pattern is now playing out with respect to discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation. In 1965, in Griswold v. Connecticut,
even the Justices staking out the most liberal position on the question
of the state's (lack of) power to regulate contraception were at pains
to note that they would not invalidate state regulation of
homosexuality, which they regarded as "promiscuity or misconduct."47
Two decades later, in Bowers v. Hardwick, a majority of the Court still
thought that private consensual homosexual conduct could only be
distinguished from "adultery, incest, and other sexual crimes" by
"fiat."48 By then, however, the social movement for equal rights for
gays and lesbians had made sufficient progress that the equation was
controversial, prompting a vigorous four-Justice dissent. And by
2003, the tide had turned, so that now only three dissenting Justices
were prepared to say that the state could prosecute a man for "deviate
sexual intercourse, namely anal sex, with a member of the same sex."49
The view of legal realism that says that judges decide cases based on
what they had for breakfast is a caricature to which almost no one
subscribes. But the view of legal realism that says that, over the long
run, judicial attitudes towards social issues track attitudes within the
46. The principal argument against living constitutionalism is that Article V's
amendment procedure allows for evolution through the political process, so that
absent amendment, unelected judges should not take it upon themselves to change
the Constitution's meaning. The whole point of a written Constitution, in this view, is
to prevent backsliding against a standard set by the framers and ratifiers of a
constitutional provision; living constitutionalism is unnecessary to prevent backsliding
and may even promote it, critics argue, because attitudes can evolve to undercut old
rights just as they can create new ones. See Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation
38-46 (1997). Although not without force, I find these arguments ultimately
unpersuasive given the supermajorities required for amending the Constitution. To
privilege the original understanding of ambiguous constitutional text is, in these
circumstances, to privilege the results of a political process that was, by modern
standards, woefully under-inclusive. It is bad enough that our foundational
documents were written and adopted by (what is by today's standards) an
unrepresentative group of men; it adds insult to injury to construe their handiwork in
a manner that preserves their privileges based on their less-than-fully-articulated
expectations and prejudices. Accordingly, although it appeals to popular sovereignty,
the argument against the living Constitution is inconsistent with (any currently
acceptable account of) popular sovereignty, at least where the question concerns the
rights of people who were excluded from the political process when the relevant
constitutional provision was adopted. I could make an argument for the living
Constitution more generally, but it would not fit in this footnote.
47. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,499 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
48. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195-96 (1986).
49. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2476 (2003).
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larger society in which they live seems unassailable. Justice White
wrote in 1986 that "to claim that a right to engage in" homosexual acts
"is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' . .. is, at best,
facetious."5 Though he may have been wrong to make history at this
level of specificity the constitutional touchstone, in a sense, Justice
White was clearly right-circa 1986, such a right was not deeply
rooted. By 2003, when Justice Kennedy assimilated the claim to a
more general right to sexual privacy, the willingness to see gay people
as, for these purposes, no different from straight people, was certainly
more deeply rooted. And in fifty or a hundred years, the claim that
Justice White dismissed as facetious may well be taken for granted, in
the way that we now take for granted that racial apartheid and
exclusion of women from the workplace are inconsistent with a right
to legal equality.
Let me be clear about what I am and am not saying. First, I am not
saying that the Court's constitutional jurisprudence is a march of
progress from the in-egalitarian past to the ever-more egalitarian
future. I happen to think that changes in social attitudes with respect
to race, sex, and sexual orientation over the last half century do
constitute moral progress. But that is hardly crucial to my
argument-nor do I think that our moral commitments as a nation
become ever-better." My point is that the Court responds to social
and political movements, not that the social and political movements
to which it responds necessarily have justice on their side.
I am also not saying that the Court always adjusts doctrine to track
social attitudes exactly. The Court's Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence expressly follows "the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society,"52 but in most areas of
constitutional doctrine, social attitudes play a less direct role. Justices,
to be confirmed, cannot be perceived as too far outside the
mainstream; once on the Court, they continue to participate in the
changing society around them; and other things being equal, they
would certainly prefer not to risk the Court's prestige on wildly
unpopular decisions. These factors ensure that over the long run,
constitutional doctrine evolves with social attitudes. But over the long
run, we are all dead.53 In the meantime, constitutional doctrine can
lag social and political change.
50. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 194.
51. For example, I am disheartened by the increasing tendency to regard
misfortune as principally a matter of individual rather than social responsibility over
roughly the same period.
52. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 (2002) (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86,100-01 (1958)).
53. John Maynard Keynes, A Tract on Monetary Reform 80 (1923) ("[L]ong run
is a misleading guide to current affairs. In the long run we are all dead.").
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Constitutional doctrine can also lead social and political change. As
I noted above, that is probably the best account of the Court's
desegregation decisions; they catalyzed the civil rights movement.
But the nation does not always follow where the Court aims to lead.
Death penalty abolitionists thought that the Supreme Court decision
in Furman v. Georgia,54 invalidating then-extant capital sentencing
procedures, might put an effective end to the death penalty in the
United States, at least in the medium term." When the states
responded by amending their statutes to conform with the nominal
mandate of the Court's decision, the Justices pulled back and affirmed
the new statutes.56
Likewise, we may now be witnessing a popular counterrevolution
with respect to the rights of sexual minorities. Although the Court
itself went out of its way in Lawrence v. Texas to distinguish laws
barring same-sex marriage from those barring same-sex intimacy,"
advocates quickly seized upon the majority opinion's reasoning (and
the dissent's parade of horribles) to challenge marriage restrictions.
Some public officials and courts accepted the argument (in some
instances on state rather than federal constitutional grounds),58 and we
are now witnessing the counter-attack of those who would restrict
marriage to heterosexual couples.
To repeat, whether, and to what extent, the movement for the rights
of sexual minorities succeeds in securing durable protection through
the courts is not my concern here. Instead, I am claiming that success
or failure will likely turn on the ability of advocates to succeed in the
social and political realm, and then to be able to present the legal
argument in a way that is true to the social and political argument.
The Loving analogy is instructive.59 There is, to my mind, a
persuasive technical legal argument that constitutional doctrine
already protects same-sex marriage. Loving says that state laws that
proscribe marrying someone because of his or her race are race-based,
and thus subject to strict scrutiny, which they fail miserably. It follows
that laws that proscribe marrying someone because of his or her sex-
54. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
55. See James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 Colum. L. Rev.
2030, 2033-38 (2000) (describing the ultimately unsuccessful litigation strategy of
seeking procedural hurdles as a means of reducing the total number of death
sentences meted out).
56. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
57. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2488 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("Unlike the moral disapproval of same-sex relations-the asserted state interest in
this case-other reasons exist to promote the institution of marriage beyond mere
moral disapproval of an excluded group.").
58. The most notable case thus far is Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,
798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003), which, in the course of finding a right to same-sex
marriage under the Massachusetts Constitution, cites the Supreme Court's decision in
Lawrence repeatedly.
59. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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as same-sex marriage prohibitions do-are sex-based, and thus trigger
the requirement of "an exceedingly persuasive justification,"'6 which
the state cannot provide. Q.E.D.
There is something profoundly right about the foregoing argument:
Distinctions drawn on the basis of sexual orientation are sex-based
distinctions, because they make numerous assumptions about the
proper sex roles of men and women. But there is also a sense in which
the Loving analogy is a kind of lawyer's trick. It leverages moral
opposition to sex discrimination into opposition to sexual orientation
discrimination. Yet someone who thinks it legitimate for the state to
draw some distinctions between straights and gays will undoubtedly
resist the leveraging; whatever reasons he or she has for thinking
sexual orientation discrimination is not invidious (at least when it
comes to marriage) will operate either to resist the sex discrimination
analogy or to imagine a sufficiently important state interest justifying
distinctions drawn on the basis of sexual orientation. To put the point
as simply as possible, the race-sex-sexual orientation analogy is only
going to be persuasive to those who are already sympathetic to the
argument that sexual orientation discrimination is invidious. Should
the Loving analogy succeed, that will be because people (including
Justices) have become sympathetic to the cause of same-sex marriage
rights, rather than vice versa.
The pattern of constitutional doctrine responding to social and
political movements translated into legal language holds for liberty
claims as well as equality claims. One might think that social and
political movements are necessary for securing legal protection
against certain forms of group-based discrimination or stereotyping
because such protection is triggered by one's membership in, or
perceived connection to, a social group, but that liberty claims are
different. Liberty claims, in this view, are about the individual qua
individual. Certainly there is something to be said for this distinction,
and one can find strongly libertarian rhetoric in, for example, the
Court's privacy/sexual autonomy cases.6 Nonetheless, social and
political movements have played roughly the same role in preparing
the ground for judicial recognition of liberty claims as they have
played with respect to equality claims.
Consider liberty claims related to the three social and political
movements discussed thus far. First, the social and political
60. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (quoting Miss. Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).
61. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992) ("At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence,
of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life."); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child.").
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movement for the rights of African Americans (and other racial
minorities) has been essential to the recognition of rights well beyond
the Equal Protection Clause itself. Doctrines involving freedom of
association,62 freedom of speech,63 and the rights of criminal suspects, 64
first took their modern shape in a context that was clearly shaped by
the civil rights movement. That is not to say that in each of these
areas the doctrine was confined to claims by racial minorities. On the
contrary, once articulated, the doctrines were generalized. But the
initial successes were undoubtedly due in substantial measure to the
fact that the social and political movement for racial equality was able
to show a clear link between the justice of its cause and the injustice of
the challenged practices.65
Likewise the abortion right was sought, and in large part achieved,
as part of the social and political movement for equal rights for
women. 66  Justice Blackmun's opinion in Roe v. Wade67 has been
criticized for, among other things, failing to recognize the connection
between the liberty claim and the social impact of legal abortion for
women as a group, but it is a mistake, in my view, to make this
criticism as a matter of the formal doctrinal pigeonhole-the Due
Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause-into which the ruling
62. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
63. See, e.g., N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
64. See Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal
Procedure, 86 Geo. L.J. 1153 (1998).
65. See id. Kahan & Meares contend that:
The need that gave birth to the existing criminal procedure regime was
institutionalized racism. Law enforcement was a key instrument of racial
repression, in both the North and the South, before the 1960's civil rights
revolution. Modern criminal procedure reflects the Supreme Court's
admirable contribution to eradicating this incidence of American apartheid.
Id. In NAACP, the Court reasoned:
Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many circumstances be
indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a
group espouses dissident beliefs.... [The NAACP] has made an
uncontroverted showing that on past occasions revelation of the identity of
its rank-and-file members has exposed these members to economic reprisal,
loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of
public hostility.... [C]ompelled disclosure of [NAACP's] Alabama
membership is likely to affect adversely the ability of [NAACP] and its
members to pursue their collective effort to foster beliefs which they
admittedly have the right to advocate ....
NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462-63; see also Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 257-71 (characterizing an
allegedly libelous advertisement of the "Committee to Defend Martin Luther King
and the Struggle for Freedom in the South," as "an expression of grievance and
protest on one of the major public issues of our time," and delimiting the state's
power to award damages for libel in actions brought by public officials against critics
of their official conduct).
66. See Lucinda Finley, The Story of Roe v. Wade, in Constitutional Law Stories
359 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004).
67. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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best fits.68 The better criticism of the Roe opinion along these lines is
that it is tone deaf to the real stakes in failing adequately to connect
the right recognized to the concerns raised by the social movement
that sought the right. As has been noted ad nauseam, Roe reads like a
case about doctors' rights rather than women's rights. But the issue is
not due process liberty versus equal protection; as the Court's partial
re-conceptualization of the abortion right in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey illustrates, one can ground a liberty claim in concerns about the
unequal effects that failure to recognize the liberty claim will have.69
Whether the Court's abortion jurisprudence correctly interprets the
Constitution is not my concern here. My point is sociological. Roe-a
case about both liberty and equality-was made possible by a social
movement, and one of the shortcomings of the Roe opinion was its
failure to connect the doctrine closely to the concerns of the
underlying social movement.
Finally, consider the social and political movement for equal rights
for sexual minorities. That movement has scored two principal
victories in the Supreme Court. In Romer v. Evans, the Court held, as
a matter of equal protection, that a state could not insist that sexual
minorities obtain protection against discrimination on that basis only
through the state constitution.7" Though the result in Romer was
welcomed by the gay rights community, the Court did not say that
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation triggers heightened
judicial scrutiny. The movement scored a second, and arguably
clearer, victory in Lawrence v. Texas, where the Court categorically
invalidated a state sodomy prohibition.7 The ruling was grounded
expressly in liberty rather than equality, but it was no less the product
of changed public attitudes because of that fact. Although Justice
Kennedy's opinion opens with an abstract paean to autonomy and is
peppered with individualistic language, its moral core resonates with
the message of the gay rights movement: Leaving Bowers v.
Hardwick72 on the books "demeans the lives of homosexual persons,"
the Court said.73
III. UNSUCCESSFUL MOVEMENTS
Thus far, I have provided examples of social and political
movements successfully translating their public demands into the
language of constitutional law. It may be useful to contrast these
68. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 1185, 1199-1209 (1992).
69. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856
(1992).
70. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
71. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2482 (2003).
72. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
73. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482.
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successful efforts to secure changes in constitutional doctrine with an
unsuccessful effort, so as to see the role that the social and political
movements play. We can then ask whether the gun rights movement
looks more like the successful or unsuccessful movements that have
gone before.
Accordingly, consider the unsuccessful effort, culminating in the
1997 decisions in Washington v. Glucksberg74 and Vacco v. Quill,75 to
secure, on the basis of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses, respectively, what is commonly called a
right to physician-assisted suicide. The plaintiffs argued in these cases
that given the Court's tacit recognition in Cruzan v. Missouri
Department of Health,76 of the right of a mentally competent adult to
refuse medical treatment, including food and water, even where the
result is death of the patient, and given broader notions of individual
autonomy in matters of life and death as expressed in the Court's
abortion jurisprudence, it followed that a terminally ill patient had the
constitutional right to the aid of a willing physician in controlling the
circumstances and timing of his or her own death.77
The Court rejected these arguments, invoking the traditional place
of the act/omission distinction in the common law.78 I believe, for
reasons articulated in an amicus brief I co-authored, that although the
act-omission distinction has salience in many contexts, it does not bear
the weight the Court placed on it in Glucksberg and Quill.79 And
although five Justices expressed some measure of agreement with the
plaintiffs' case, the bottom line was 9-0 to reject their claims. Rather
than re-litigate the issues here, however, I want to suggest that the
failure of the plaintiffs' case was not primarily a matter of doctrine or
moral philosophy. They failed in substantial part because a powerful
and sympathetic social and political movement was on the opposite
side of the issue.
74. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
75. 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
76. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
77. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 723-24.
78. Quill, 521 U.S. at 802-08; Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 725.
79. Brief of Amicus Curiae of State Legislators in Support of Respondents at 8,
Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (No. 95-1858) and Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702 (1997) (No. 96-110). The back-of-the-envelope version of my argument goes
as follows: suppose a terminally ill patient wishes to remain connected to a respirator,
so as to savor whatever precious moments of life he has remaining. Suppose further
that the patient's sworn enemy surreptitiously disconnects the respirator, hastening
death. The sworn enemy thereby commits murder because he takes the affirmative
act of disconnecting the respirator. One might think, per Cruzan, that there is a
substantial moral distinction between such an act, taken against the patient's will, and
the merciful act of disconnecting a respirator from a patient who wishes to expire.
But the distinction is not between acts and omissions. It is between non-consensual
and consensual acts. Likewise, the longer version of the argument explains, the key
feature of a physician's provision of death-causing medication to a terminally ill
patient is the patient's desire for the medication.
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Groups like "Not Dead Yet" and other organizations representing
the interests of Americans with disabilities opposed judicial (and
statutory) recognition of a right to physician-assisted suicide because
they feared, perhaps not unreasonably, that a right to die could
become a duty to die.8" They worried that legislatures and judges
would extend the right to those groups, and only those groups, of
individuals whose lives the majority (including a majority of judges)
thought were not worth living: people with severe physical, mental,
and emotional disabilities.8'
I happen to think (as my co-counsel and I argued in our amicus
brief) that the concerns of the disability advocates could have been
met by a right subject to various forms of regulation. But the
disability rights advocates did not share that confidence, and perhaps
more importantly, their presence in the case as amici and as protesters
outside the Supreme Court building was undoubtedly felt inside the
Justices' chambers.82 The position of the disability rights advocates
provided a powerful counterweight to the suggestion by some on the
plaintiffs' side that opposition to a right to physician-assisted suicide
was necessarily part of an effort to impose a religious view on others.83
It made the cases appear as a conflict between, on the one hand,
libertarians claiming a right for themselves and, on the other hand, a
vulnerable population that would suffer death as the price for others'
liberty.
80. Brief of Amici Curiae of Not Dead Yet and American Disabled for Attendant
Programs Today in Support of Petitioners at 11, Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997)
(No. 95-1858).
81. See id.
82. The Justices expressly worried about vulnerable populations in Glucksberg
and Quill. See Quill, 521 U.S. at 808-09 ("[P]rotecting vulnerable people from
indifference, prejudice, and psychological and financial pressure to end their lives;
and avoiding a possible slide towards euthanasia-are ... valid and important public
interests [that] easily satisfy the constitutional requirement that a legislative
classification bear a rational relation to some legitimate end."). According to
Glucksberg:
Leaving aside any difficulties in coming to a clear concept of imminent
death, mistaken decisions may result from inadequate palliative care or a
terminal prognosis that turns out to be error; coercion and abuse may stem
from the large medical bills that family members cannot bear or
unreimbursed hospitals decline to shoulder. Voluntary and involuntary
euthanasia may result once doctors are authorized to prescribe lethal
medication in the first instance, for they might find it pointless to distinguish
between patients who administer their own fatal drugs and those who wish
not to, and their compassion for those who suffer may obscure the
distinction between those who ask for death and those who may be unable to
request it.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 782-83.
83. That argument was advanced in Ronald Dworkin et al., Assisted Suicide: The
Philosophers' Brief, reprinted in N.Y. Rev. Books, Mar. 27, 1997, at 41. For an
extended version of the argument, see Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion 179-217
(1993).
[Vol. 73
IDENTITY POLITICS
The configuration of interests in the physician-assisted suicide
cases-an individual libertarian claim pitted against the asserted
interests of a vulnerable population-can also be found in at least two
other contexts: abortion and gun rights. For predictive purposes,
therefore, one would want to know whether a putative individual right
to own and possess firearms-with the collateral consequence that
some innocents who otherwise would have lived will die as a result of
the use of those firearms--is more like a putative right to physician-
assisted suicide-with the collateral consequence that some people
will be pressured into prematurely ending their lives-or the
constitutional right to abortion-which has the collateral consequence
of killing fetuses, but which the Court nonetheless recognized.
With respect to gun rights, the Court seems unlikely to follow the
pattern it followed in its abortion jurisprudence because the
configuration of organized interest groups is not strictly analogous.
When the Court decided Roe in 1973 there was an active women's
rights movement, arguably at the height of its power. By contrast,
while there certainly were people who strongly opposed abortion on
religious and moral grounds, the national pro-life movement that has
grown up in opposition to Roe had nothing like the organizational
sophistication it now has.' Advocates for abortion rights were able to
portray the case as primarily about women's safety rather than the
lives of fetuses, perhaps because of the widespread (and arguably
accurate) perception in 1973 that a legal right to abortion would not
actually have led to more abortions; it would simply move abortion
from unsafe back alleys to the relative safety of hospitals, clinics, and
doctors' offices."
Like the abortion rights advocates of the early 1970s (and beyond),
advocates of an individual constitutional right to own and possess
firearms resist the notion that a right for them would mean death for
others. Slogans like "guns don't kill, people kill" and research by
scholars like John Lott purporting to show that gun rights increase
84. Lucinda Finley argues that views about religion and sex roles largely
determine individual views about abortion, but she acknowledges the symbolic use of
Roe as a rallying point for organizing anti-abortion/pro-life sentiment. See Finley,
supra note 66, at 403-05.
85. Abortion complications accounted for approximately fourteen percent of
maternal mortality in 1930, twenty-five percent by 1950, and forty-five percent by
1960. Leslie J. Regan, When Abortion Was a Crime 213-14 (1997). For Justice
Powell, the health crisis facing women was an important rationale for Roe. A few
years before the decision, Powell was called by a distraught, young office clerk who
had attempted an abortion on his lover. The woman had asked the clerk to follow her
instructions but during the attempt, she hemorrhaged and died. With Powell's
assistance, the boy told his story to local prosecutors, who declined to press charges.
According to John Jeffries, "[t]his incident convinced Powell that women would seek
abortions whether they were legal or not and that driving the practice underground
led to danger and death." John Jeffries, Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. 347 (1994).
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rather than decrease public safety86 aim to sway public opinion
(including judicial opinion) on the question of the collateral effects of
an individual right to own and possess firearms.
But the social, political, and legal landscape with respect to gun
rights today is significantly different from the landscape with respect
to abortion rights in 1973. Notwithstanding the political power of the
National Rifle Association ("NRA"), there is a highly motivated
social and political movement that argues against gun rights.
Presidential candidates must pay attention to swing voters in western
Pennsylvania who favor gun rights, but as a more general matter, the
NRA does not have the political stage to itself. Organizations like the
Violence Policy Center, the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun
Violence, and many others vigorously argue that widespread firearms
possession endangers rather than protects human security. Who has
the better of this empirical argument is not my concern here. The
point is that judges are likely to understand it as a political dispute
between well-organized persons with different ideological viewpoints,
and accordingly, they will see no great need to intervene on one side
or the other.
Moreover, by contrast with prior successful movements for
constitutional change through the courts, the movement for gun rights
does not pit an oppressed group against an oppressive majority. After
all, supporters of gun rights are not, by any reasonable measure,
oppressed. Groups like the NRA fight tepid regulation like the
assault weapons ban and the Brady Act's waiting period for gun
purchases not because they consider such regulations in themselves to
be substantial denials of the right to own and possess firearms, but
because they fear a political slippery slope. Whether that fear is
realistic, the claim that if government goes much further than it is
currently just barely going, we will be oppressed, is not a very effective
slogan for rallying sympathy for a group seeking judicial recognition
of a constitutional right.
This is not to say that the disproportionately white, male, and rural
citizens who support gun rights cannot and do not make a more
general claim to being victimized by what they and their sympathizers
regard as an elitist liberal establishment (even when all branches of
the national government and most state governments are in
Republican hands). Such "angry white men" have found a
sympathetic audience in Justices Scalia and Thomas on issues like
86. See generally John R. Lott, Jr., More Guns, Less Crime: Understanding Crime
and Gun-Control Laws (1998). I say "purporting" because Lott's methods and claims
are dubious. See generally Ian Ayres and John J. Donohue 1II, Shooting Down the
More Guns, Less Crime Hypothesis, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1193 (2003).
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affirmative action, women's rights, and gay rights,87 but even these
Justices have not connected support for the individual-right
conception of the Second Amendment with any identity politics
movement, seeing the former as simply a matter of the original
understanding (if that). 88  As I have endeavored to show in this
Article, arguments about the original understanding play some role in
the public justification of the Court's decisions, but do not, by
themselves, suffice to bring about doctrinal change.
One might think that the failure of the gun rights movement to
portray itself as oppressed does not distinguish that movement from
the abortion rights movement. As John Ely observed in Roe's
aftermath, for a Court that cares about oppressed minorities, women's
sheer numbers and their superior ability-relative to fetuses-to
organize politically, ought to have counted as an argument against
taking abortion out of the political process, rather than as a reason to
side with women against fetuses.89 But, so far as I can tell, that point
was mostly lost on the Court,' and more importantly, for all the talk
of the Court's role in protecting those unable to protect themselves in
the political process, if a broad-based social movement has not
developed to protect the interests of some group-as no such
movement with respect to fetuses had yet developed circa 1973-the
Court is unlikely to treat that group as entitled to judicial solicitude.
To put the last point starkly, a group whose oppression is so
complete as to be invisible to mainstream public opinion, including
the mainstream judges who sit on the Supreme Court, will not register
with the Justices as oppressed. Think of African Americans in the
early Republic, women in the late nineteenth century, sexual
minorities in the middle of the last century, and non-human animals
today. I am suggesting that circa 1973, fetuses were seen by the Court
as comparable, and accordingly, that when it was decided, Roe was
not seen as a case that pitted one well-organized group claiming to be
oppressed - women - against another well-organized group -
fetuses-claiming to be oppressed by the rights claims of the first
group. It was instead seen as a case pitting one oppressed group-
women-against laws enacted by the oppressor class-male-
87. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349-78 (2003) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 566-603 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636-53 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
88. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 938-39 (1997) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (inviting future litigation on the question of whether, and to what extent,
the Second Amendment bars firearms regulation).
89. John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf, in On Constitutional Ground 281,
289 (1996).
90. In trivializing the interests at stake for women forced to bear an unwanted
pregnancy, Justice White's Roe dissent did portray the case as a conflict between fetal
life and women's "convenience," but his was not a point about the political process.
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 222 (1973) (White, J., dissenting) (Justice White's Roe v.
Wade dissent is published in Doe v. Bolton).
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dominated legislatures.91 That is not the political valence of the gun
rights debate today. Today, both the advocates of gun rights and
victims of gun violence claim to be oppressed by the policies the other
group favors, and there is no reason to think the Court is more likely
to see the issue from the perspective of the gun rights advocates.
Before concluding, I must address an objection that my critics are
no doubt by now practically screaming. The objection goes like this:
We can assume, arguendo, that Dorf is right that to obtain heightened
equal protection scrutiny on the basis of some classification, or to
have some conduct engaged in by some particular group recognized as
a fundamental right for substantive due process purposes, a mobilized
social movement is necessary. But matters are entirely different
where, as in the case of a claimed right to own and possess firearms,
there is an express provision of the Bill of Rights on point. There, the
ordinary reasons that counsel caution in the recognition of new
equality or liberty claims do not apply, and courts are free to pick the
best interpretation, having in mind such conventional constitutional
factors as the original understanding, post-enactment history,
structure, and so forth.
This objection may be meant (by my hypothetical apoplectic
reader) prescriptively. Express provisions of the Bill of Rights (and
other express constitutional provisions) have a greater call on judges,
in this view, than the open-ended Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses. The objection is then a brief for textualism A la Hugo Black
or Antonin Scalia. It is also, in the context of my argument, a non
sequitur, for I am not making the prescriptive claim that constitutional
doctrine should be responsive to social and political movements; I am
making the descriptive claim that it is so.
Suppose then that the objection is meant descriptively. There are
numerous statements by the Court, going back at least to the Carolene
Products footnote itself, indicating that the Justices have a freer hand,
because their actions are more legitimate, when they construe a
specifically enumerated right than when they rely on the open-ended
language of the Fourteenth Amendment alone.92 But it is not at all
91. Although irrelevant to my argument, I should point out that nothing I say in
the text commits me to the view that Roe was wrongly decided. That would require
an evaluation of the arguments from what H.L.A. Hart called an "internal point of
view." H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 89 (1st ed. 1961). This Article takes an
external point of view on constitutional argument, describing the social circumstances
that typically give rise to doctrinal change, as opposed to prescribing the
circumstances under which courts should implement doctrinal change. Were I to take
an internal point of view, I might find persuasive the feminist argument that women
cannot be forced by law to give up their bodily autonomy for fetuses, even on the
assumption that fetuses are full persons. See, e.g., Eileen L. McDonagh, Breaking the
Abortion Deadlock: From Choice to Consent (1996). Or I might not.
92. For a description and critique of the Court's view and some of the confusions
to which it has led, see Peter J. Rubin, Square Pegs and Round Holes, 103 Colum. L.
Rev. 833 (2003).
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clear that the Court has meant what it said. Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr. wrote in 1918 that, notwithstanding specific enumeration in the
First Amendment, "free speech stands no differently than freedom
from vaccination,"93 and it was not until the 1960s, in Brandenburg v.
Ohio,94  that the Court developed a truly speech-protective
jurisprudence. Likewise, the express protections for criminal suspects
contained in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments were not
interpreted robustly until the same period.95 What changed was not
the Court's view of the original understanding of these provisions but
its view of the role of police and prosecutors relative to the
(disproportionately African American) population of suspects.
Likewise, it is not as though people who favor gun control ask the
Court to ignore the Second Amendment.96 They say, as those
resisting the new interpretations of the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments said in the 1960s, that the Amendment, best
understood, does not mean what the advocates of changed doctrine
claim. In particular, they say that the Second Amendment is best read
to protect state militias against federal encroachment or that if read to
protect an individual right to own, possess, and/or use firearms, it is a
right subject to extensive regulation of the sort that many of the
individualists would deem unacceptable. The debate, in other words,
is not over whether to enforce the Second Amendment, but over what
it means. And within that realm, there is little reason to think that the
sociology of rights claims, in which the Court responds to sympathetic
social and political movements, differs substantially from cases
involving other rights.
CONCLUSION
Absent a substantial change in personnel, the Supreme Court will
not likely grant robust judicial protection to an individual right to own
and possess firearms in the near future. Should the Court take a case
in which the issue is presented, no doubt it will produce a scholarly
disquisition on the original understanding and subsequent
development of the right to keep and bear arms. But the real
determinants of its decision will likely lie elsewhere-in its attitude
towards the social and political movements surrounding the gun
93. Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment
Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 719, 757 (1975) (reproducing
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, to Learned Hand (June 24, 1918)).
94. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
95. See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
96. Well, oddly enough, perhaps some scholars do say something like this. See
generally William Merkel & Richard Uviller, The Militia and the Right to Arms, or,
How the Second Amendment Fell Silent (2002) (arguing that the Second Amendment
is obsolete); David Williams, The Mythic Meanings of the Second Amendment (2003)
(same).
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question. At present, the gun rights movement does not have the
characteristic features of a movement that obtains desired doctrinal
change.
In the extremely unlikely event that I were asked to serve as a
consultant to the gun rights movement, and in the even more unlikely
event that I were to take the job, my advice about how to obtain
judicial change would be simple: Make whatever legal arguments you
find most persuasive, but go for the hearts and minds of your fellow
citizens. To some extent, by attempting to appeal to women and
minorities who feel vulnerable to private violence, groups like the
NRA have already adopted this strategy as a matter of affecting
political change.
More broadly, my argument here runs both parallel and counter to
the familiar lament that Americans turn too readily to the courts
rather than the political process for redress of their grievances. If I
am right that social and political movements spur doctrinal change,
then a strategy that targets just the courts will not likely succeed even
in the courts. To affect change through the courts, activists of all
stripes must pay the lion's share of attention to building a social and
political movement. And although I have avoided prescriptive
statements throughout this Article, I would conclude with a frankly
normative observation: The need to buttress formal legal arguments
with attitude-changing actions addressed to the broad mass of the
public seems entirely appropriate in a constitutional democracy that
properly fears both the tyranny of the majority and government by
judiciary.
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